Divorce -- Substituted Service of Summons -- Suggested Statutory Reforms by Phillips, J. Dickson, Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 25 | Number 2 Article 5
2-1-1947
Divorce -- Substituted Service of Summons --
Suggested Statutory Reforms
J. Dickson Phillips Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. D. Phillips Jr., Divorce -- Substituted Service of Summons -- Suggested Statutory Reforms, 25 N.C. L. Rev. 192 (1947).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol25/iss2/5
North Carolina
Law Review
VOLUME 25 FEBRUARY, 1947 NUMBER 2
STUDENT BOARD OF EDITORS
CYRUS F. LEE, Editor-in-Chief
LoGAN D. HOWELL, Associate Editor
WuIu L , B. AYCOCK, Associate Editor
JOE H. BARRINGTON, JR. JOHN R. JORDAN, JR.
WALTER E. BRocx, JR. MII.s J. McCoRMIcK
WLLIAM H. BURTON, JR. L. P. McLENDON, JR.
WiLLIAM A. DEES, JR. J. DICKSON PHILLIPS, JR.
THOMAS G. DILL Louis J. PoIssoN, JR.
HENRY L. HARKEY J. T. RENDLEMAN
C. D. HOGuE, JR. CLAUDE F. SEILA
NOEL R. S. WOODHOUSE
BAR EDITOR
EDWNRD L. CANNON -
FACULTY ADVISORS
HERBERT R. BAER JOHN P. DALZELL
HENRY P. BRANDIS, JR. FRANK W. HANFT
M. S. BRECKENRIDGE FREDERICK B. McCALL
ALBERT COATES M. T. VAN HEcKE
ROBERT H. WETTACH
Publication of signed contributions from any source does not signify adoption
of the views expressed by the LAW RE IEw or its editors collectively.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Divorce-Substituted Service of Summons-Suggested
Statutory Reforms
A recent North Carolina case' reveals certain undesirable aspects of
our procedural divorce law, particularly the service of summons by pub-
lication in divorce cases, which, it is believed, might well be corrected.
Plaintiff brought an action for divorce on grounds of two years'
separation in the Superior Court of Martin County. At the time, plain-
' Smith v. Smith, 226 N. C. 506, 39 S.E. (2d) 391 (1946). Criticisms in this note
are definitely not directed at the granting of the divorce decree on its merits. Rather
they are directed at the process by which jurisdiction was obtained. Whatever the
particular merits of the case, it is felt that such process is definitely not sufficient
in cases where the serious question of the advisability of destroying the marital
relationship is under consideration.
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tiff was a resident of Hertford County and his wife was a non-resident
of the state. They had never lived together in either Martin or Hert-
ford County, having been residents of Warren County until the time of
their separation two years before. An order for service of summons by
publication was issued by the clerk of court based upon an affidavit of
the plaintiff which conformed to the essential statutory requirement 2 in
that it specified that "after due diligence . . . [the defendant] cannot
be found within the State of North Carolina." The order directed that
"summons be served by publication in some newspaper published in
Martin County as required by law." Notice of the summons was pub-
lished in due conformity to the statutory requirements3 in The Enter-
prise, a newspaper published in Williamston, Martin County. The
defendant failed to make appearance. After the submission of issues
to the jury, a decree of absolute divorce was entered on the verdict
rendered. Plaintiff died some five months later; and seven months
after his death defendant appeared by motion in the cause to have the
decree set aside. At that time the court, on motion of the plaintiff's
executor) allowed an amendment nun pro tune of the original order by
inserting the name of the newspaper therein. Defendant alleged no
actual notice of the pending action. The attack on the validity of
process was directed primarily at showing that the statutory require-
ment that, "The order must direct the publication in one or more news-
papers to be designated as most likely to give notice to the person to
be served . . . "4 had not been complied with (italics ours). Defendant
contended that this clause of the statute makes mandatory a specific
recitation in the clerk's order that the newspaper to be used is the one
most likely to give notice. Defendant further argued that the clerk ob-
viously could not have made such a recitation in this order, because the
newspaper was published in a locality one hundred miles from Warren
County where defendant's North Carolina residence had been, and de-
fendant had no contacts in the locality where publication was made.
Defendant contended that this constituted such a defect in the service
of summons as to justify setting aside the decree. Held: G. S. 1-99
does not specifically require that an order for the publication of notice
of summons state that the newspaper is the one "most likely to give
notice to the person to be served." The court, citing one previous
North Carolina case,5 based this construction of the statute on the
proposition that when an order for publication of notice of summons
is made by a court of record, there is a presumption of the rightfulness
of its decrees and that the newspaper specified is the one most likely
to give notice.
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-98. IN. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §1-99.
'Ibid.5 Elias v. Comm'r's. of Buncombe, 198 N. C. 733, 153 S. E. 323 (1930).
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The upshot of this construction of G. S. 1-99 is that insofar as a
defendant who has had no actual notice via the publication is concerned,
the legislature might as well have omitted the phrase, "to be designated
as most likely to give notice . . . ," from the statute. The words may
serve to bring the legislative mandate to the clerk's attention, but if he
fails to obey the mandate, as it appears he did in the principal case, his
failure is not subject to attack by the prejudiced defendant. A New
York provision6 is not so dissimilar from our G. S. 1-99 as to demand an
exactly opposite construction; but that is just what occurred in that
jurisdiction. The pertinent phraseology of that statute, "The order ...
must direct that such service be made by publication thereof in two
newspapers. . ., designated in the order as most likely to give notice to
the defendant to be served... ," was construed by a New York supreme
court to require that the order expressly provide that the newspapers
are the ones most likely to give notice; and the court held that failure
to do so constituted a fatal defect in process. The court also pointed out
that the newspapers named in the order attacked were obviously not
papers most likely to give notice, also a fatal defect.7
The construction announced by our court leads to an incongruous
result when it is considered that for defects in service by publication
less serious to the defendant, our court is quick to set aside the decree
of divorce. Thus, where the plaintiff's affidavit alleged that his wife
was a non-resident of the state, or that she was keeping herself con-
cealed within the state, but failed to allege that "after due diligence the
defendant cannot be found within the State of North Carolina," the
court set aside the decree.8 In another divorce case where the sum-
mons, as published, stated that the action was pending in a different
county from the one in which it was actually pending, but did require
the defendant to appear at the office of the clerk of the court. of the
correct county, the decree was set aside.9 Again, where the affidavit
set forth that a summons had been issued to the sheriff and had been
returned indorsed: "The defendant, . . . , cannot, after due diligence,
be found in Mecklenburg County or in the State of North Carolina";
and further specified that the plaintiff, after due diligence, had been un-
able to locate the defendant and her whereabouts were unknown to the
plaintiff; the court set aside the decree because the affidavit, outside
the quoted sheriff's indorsement, failed to make the essential recitation.9'
Can it be seriously contended that a defendant is more prejudiced by the
above noted defects in process than he would be by the fact that the
IN. Y. RuLEs oF CIVIL PRACTiCE, Rule 50.
Glinski v. Glinski, 131 Misc. 1, 225 N. Y. Supp. 505 (1927).
'Fowler v. Fowler, 190 N. C. 536, 130 S. E. 315 (1925).
' Guerin v. Guerin, 208 N. C. 457, 181 S. E. 274 (1935).
" Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 224 N. C. 275, 29 S. E. (2d) 901 (1944).
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publication was made in a newspaper which had only the remotest possi-
bility of ever conveying notice to him?
The opportunity for taking advantage of this loophole in the pro-
cedural safeguards incident to divorce actions is enhanced by another
statute. As pointed out by the court in the principal case, G. S. 50-3,
which provides that in proceedings for divorce the summons shall be
returnable to the court of the county in which either plaintiff or def end-
ant resides, is not jurisdictional, but relates to venue, and may be waived
by failure of the defendant to demand in writing before answering that
the trial be had in the proper county. This statute then provides a
perfect inducement to a plaintiff seeking a divorce to institute proceed-
ings in a county where the newspaper used for publication is definitely
not likely to give actual notice, knowing that these facts alone will not
subject the proceedings to possible invalidation.10
It is realized that everything said to -this point is as applicable to
other actions where service is allowed by publication as it is to divorce
actions. However, it is believed that on grounds both of public policy
and of the legal considerations involved, criticism of the state of our
law on this subject is especially pertinent to divorce actions. It is per-
haps trite to say that every thinking citizen is appalled by the number
of divorce decrees now granted by our courts, and at the apparent ease
with which they are obtained. Our recently much-publicized "divorce
mill"" verifies the justification for this feeling. The high proportion
of divorce actions where service is made by publication may perhaps
partially explain the large number of decrees granted.' 2 Is it illogical
to suppose that the statutory defects noted may be conducive to the
10 It is gratifying to learn from a superior court clerk that some of our superior
court judges, taking cognizance of these abuses possible under G. S. 50-3, are re-
fusing to try divorce actions where the plaintiff is a non-resident of the county
where the action is instituted, if the service has been made by publication. This
procedure by the judges is commendable as preventing the abuses noted, but at least
one authority has questioned the legality of such action by a judge without demand
by the defendant. MclNTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRAcCE AND PROCEDURE (1929
ed.) §295.
. Burke Davis, Divorce, Charlotte News, Nov. 18, 1946; Nov. 19, 1946; Nov.
20, 1946.
"
2Upon written inquiry to the clerks of the superior courts, the following ex-
cerpts from letters received in reply from three geographically representative
counties should serve as a fairly accurate cross-section view: (1) ". . . within the
last three years the average yearly divorces exceed 200 in number. I would say
that at least 50 per cent of these are cases in which the defendant is served by pub-
lication of summons." (2) "We average around 350 divorce cases in this county
each year. Of this number, perhaps one-half are served by publication on the de-
fendants who are alleged not to be residents, of the State of North Carolina or of
[this] county." (3) "During the year 1943 there were two hundred ninety-one
(291) divorce cases tried in [this] county. In 1944 there were three hundred
twenty-three (323), in 1945 there were four hundred sixty-eight (468) and while
I do not have the complete record for 1946, there has been a sharp increase in the
divorces granted .... I estimate that service of summons' is made by publication
in thirty per cent (30%) of these cases."
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widespread practice of making service by publication in these actions?
Would not more contested divorces lower the number of decrees granted?
If our procedure were tightened up, parties might think more seriously
before entering into the marital relationship in the first place.
These features of our procedural divorce law are also susceptible to
criticism on a purely legal basis. Our statute, G. S. 1-98, makes no dis-
tinction between the procedure to be employed in obtaining service by
publication in divorce actions and in the other types of action where it
is allowed; they are all listed together, all to be governed by the same
procedure outlined in G. S. 1-99. The classification of these actions is
made on the basis that they are all actions in rem or quasi in rem, where
this form of substituted service constitutes due process of law; as dis-
tinguished from in personam actions where it does not, the defendant
being a non-resident of the state. To bring divorce actions within this
classification, the questionable doctrine of considering the marriage rela-
tionship itself the res, is invoked. The idea then is that over this
relationship the state has control, and may dissolve it even where one
of the two parties concerned has not been actually notified of the pend-
ing proceedings. The inclusion of divorce actions within this classifica-
tion leads to certain incongruities which are strikingly presented by Mr.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in the famous case of Willianms v. North
Carolina3 on its first trip to the Supreme Court of the United States.
One of the results, he says, is that, ". . . settled family relationships
may be destroyed by a procedure that we would not recognize if the
suit were one to collect a grocery bill." Justice Jackson proceeds to
question the advisability of allowing any form of substituted service in
divorce actions. Admitting, however, that they must be allowed to
prevent a party who is guilty of conduct which would justify a divorce
in North Carolina from going to a state where it would not, and thus
evading our law,14 this criticism of the whole doctrine should serve to
indicate that divorce actions are not of the same nature as the other
actions with which they are classified. Certainly they are entitled to
special consideration in this respect, even if they are allowed to remain
in the general classification of actions where service by publication may
be made. This special consideration should take form in such stringent
safeguarding, by statutes and judicial construction, of the whole substi-
tuted service process in divorce actions as to insure the best chance
possible of giving actual notice to the defendant. In North Carolina,
statutes and judicial construction of these statutes do not afford these
safeguards. It would certainly appear that personal service on a de-
1' 317 U. S. 287, 316 (1942). This case, in all its stages, is discussed at length
in Baer, So Your Client Wants a Divorce! (1945) 24 N. C. L. REv. 1.
14 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 735 (1877).
(Vol. 25
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fendant, whose residence out of state is known, by an officer of the
county of his out of state residence, is a device more apt to give actual
notice than is service by publication. Yet our statute' 5 which provides
for such service states that it may be used in lieu of publication; and the
statute has been construed to mean that this form is optional and not
exclusive of service by publication in newspapers. 16 Why, if it is con-
sonant with our conception of natural justice that a defendant should
have actual notice if at all possible, should not this more certain form be
employed exclusively when available?
To summarize the state of our law on the subject of substituted
service of summons in divorce actions: Service by publication, the most
haphazard method, is elevated to a position of equality with a more cer-
tain form by G. S. 1-104. G. S. 50-3 makes it possible for a plaintiff
to bring his action for divorce in any county, subject only to the de-
fendant's demand in writing that it be removed to another county before
answering.' 7 This demand will probably not be forthcoming if service
is made by publication in a newspaper of the county where the action
is commenced and that county is one wherein the absent defendant has
no contact with persons who might see the notice. The fact that pub-
lication is made in a newspaper which had only the barest mathematical
chance of giving actual notice to the defendant is not a basis for attack
on the validity of a decree rendered in the action, due to our court's
construction of G. S. 1-99 in the principal case.
In order to eliminate these defects, it is submitted that North Caro-
lina should pass legislation designed to provide an entirely separate pro-
cedure for substituted service of summons in divorce actions. Such
legislation should have two main objectives: First, to make service by
publication strictly a last-resort process; and second, to insure, insofar
as is possible, that when publication is used it has the best chance pos-
sible of giving actual notice.
A review of the statutes of all the states revealed one state which,
it is believed, has legislation more nearly capable than any other of
achieving the first objective. The Colorado Statutes'8 provide in sub-
"IN. C. GaIr. STAT. (1943) §1-104.1 8Mullen v. Norfolk & Carolina Canal Co., 114 N. C. 8, 19 S. E. 106 (1894).
And possibly by the court ex 2nero motu, see note 10 supra.
COLORADO STATuTES AxnoTATED (1935) c. 56, §§4 and 5.
Section 4: "In every action for divorce, except where defendant is without the
United States, personal service of the summons and a copy of the complaint shall be
made on the defendant, except as provided in the next succeeding section, or as
hereafter provided. If such service be made within the state of Colorado, then the
defendant shall have thirty days thereafter within which to plead to said complaint;
if the defendant is not within the state of Colorado, then personal service of the
summons and a copy of the complaint may be made by the sheriff of the county
in any state in which such defendant is found, or by a United States marshal if
the defendant is found in a United States territory or district, and the return of
such officer showing such personal service shall be held sufficient service to give
19471
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stance: (1) That in every action for divorce, except where the defendant
is without the United States, personal service of the summons and a
copy of the complaint shall be made on the defendant, except as here-
after provided. (The form for return of summons specified in our
G. S. 1-104 might very well be incorporated in this section.) (2) When
it is ascertained that personal service is absolutely impossible, then, and
then only will service by publication be ordered. This is ascertained
from an affidavit by the plaintiff showing in detail aill the efforts made
by plaintiff to procure personal service, and all the facts which plaintiff
has of defendant's location, and all the facts within plaintiff's knowledge
which might help in locating defendant; and from a personal examina-
tion of the plaintiff relative to these facts by the court or judge in vaca-
tion. (The Colorado courts, in construing earlier similar statutes, have
insisted upon a strict compliance with all of the requirements therein,
and demand that such compliance be made a matter of record, parol
evidence being inadmissible to prove it.) 19
To attain the second objective, a statute such as follows is suggested,
such statute to immediately succeed those modeled after the Colorado
statutes: In every action for divorce where service of summons by
publication is ordered the order shall direct the publication in one or
two newspapers of general circulation in the county where it or they
are published; and the order shall contain an express statement that
the court jurisdiction of such defendant; and in case of such service outside of the
state of Colorado the defendant shall have fifty days from the date of such service
within which to plead to such complaint, and in all cases the time within which the
defendant must appear and plead shall be stated in the summons. Service of sum-
mons by a sheriff may be made through an undersheriff, or deputy sheriff in the
name of the sheriff, and service by a United States marshal may be made through
a deputy marshal in the name of the marshal. If the defendant is without the
United States such defendant shall be served by publication in the manner pro-
vided in the next succeeding section."
Section 5: "In any case where the defendant is without the state of Colorado
and his or her location is unknown to the plaintiff, or where the defendant conceals
himself or herself in Colorado so that summons cannot be personally served on him
or her, or where the plaintiff has no knowledge or notice, direct or indirect, of
where the defendant can be found, within or without the state of Colorado, the
palintiff may make an application to the court for an order to make service of the
summons on the defendant by publication; such application shall be made under oath
and shall state fully and in detail all of the efforts made by the plaintiff to procure
personal service of the summons on the defendant, and all of the knowledge of the
plaintiff concerning the location of the defendant and shall state all the facts within
the knowledge of the plaintiff which might assist in learning the address of the
defendant. The court, or the judge thereof, in vacation, shall, upon the hearing of
said application, carefully examine the plaintiff and such other witnesses as shall
be produced, in order to determine what steps shall be taken to notify such absent
defendant of the pendency of the action. The court or the judge thereof shall, if
satisfied of the good faith of the plaintiff cause the summons to be published in
the same manner and with like effect as is now provided by law for publication of
summons in cases of attachment." (This last sentence, for our purposes, should
read, ". . . cause the summons to be published as provided in the next succeeding
section.")
"' Roberts v. Roberts, 3 Colo. App. 6, 31 Pac. 941 (1892).
[Vol. 25
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the newspaper or newspapers specified therein have been determined
from the application and examination required by law to be that or
those most likely to give notice to the person to be served. Provided;
that if it be shown that such statement did not appear in said order,
or that the information given in the application and examination re-
quired by the immediately preceding section was so false and mis-
leading as to cause the newspaper or newspapers specified not to be
that or those most likely to give notice to the person to be served, or
that from the information given in such application and examination
the newspaper or newspapers specified could not reasonably have been
determined to be those most likely to give such notice, then the service
of summons is to be void and of no effect.20
J. DICKSON PHILLIPs, JR.
Evidence-Opinion Rule-Estimate of Speed from Mark on Road
In Tyndall v. Hines Co.1 plaintiff was struck by defendant's truck
while walking on the shoulder of the road. A highway patrolman testi-
fied as to the presence of marks on the grass and shoulder. He testified
that they were not brake marks, but were marks made when the truck
made a sudden turn, thus shifting the weight to one side or the other.
The trial court allowed him to give his opinion as to tle speed of the
vehicle, based upon such physical data. On appeal, questioning the
admissibility of the evidence and alleging its admission was prejudicial
to the defendant, the Supreme Court Held: That the witness not having
seen the truck in motion would not be permitted to give an opinion as
to its speed. "The opinion must be of facts observed. The witness
must speak of facts within his knowledge. He cannot under the guise
of an opinion give his deductive conclusion from what he saw and
knew.'  Finding the evidence prejudicial, the court awarded the de-
fendant a new trial.
Instances where the court will allow the witness to express himself
in terms of inferences drawn from facts observed may be divided in
two classes, which are subject to separate and distinct rules of admis-
sibility: (1) Where the witness is specially qualified and by virtue of
such may aid the jury. (2) Where the witness is unable otherwise to
present the facts to the jury.3 The former which is most commonly
characterized as expert opinion is received because the witness' skill in
"' The provisions for length and cost of publication could be inserted after the
portion set out above.
* 226 N. C. 620, 39 S. E. (2d) 828 (1940).
* Id. at 623, 39 S. E. (2d) at 830.
* It is recognized that these classifications are but broad general divisions of
admissible opinion, and that there are some admissible opinions that cannot be easily
)laced in one or the other class but exist in the twilight zone of both.
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